W4416110477 Working papers AI × management and organizations

Machine Governance: An Institutional Theory of Human-AI Delegation

Sinclair Davidson

Also recorded as: doi:10.2139/ssrn.5705884 · ssrn:5705884

ssrn abstract page · 2025-11-11

Recorded claims
1
coded from the inspected source
Evidence classes
1
ssrn-abstract-page
Recorded limitations
2
stated, never hidden

From the hash-bound evidence releases

Recorded claims

Each claim states what the inspected source says, at the recorded location—bounded by its scope and graded by its confidence. Nothing here is a synthesis across works.

The abstract extends principal–agent and institutional theory by relocating the binding governance constraint for machine delegation from incentives to verification, introducing ontological hazard and constraint compatibility, and requiring corrigible institutional architectures.

confidence: high ssrn-abstract-page apw-e1-ssrn-backfill

Scope: abstract-level institutional and organizational economics theory

Structured relationships

In-corpus citations

Only source-supplied cites relationships whose two endpoints are admitted are shown. Invocation evidence remains a separate relationship.

Cites (0)

No in-corpus outgoing citation is available in the current enrichment coverage.

Cited by (0)

No in-corpus incoming citation is available in the current enrichment coverage.

Boundaries

Limitations & independence

Recorded at coding time, carried with the work forever. A claim without its limits is not evidence.

Recorded limitations

  • Abstract-level evidence only; full text not inspected.
  • The page presents a theoretical argument and this record does not claim empirical testing.

Source independence

ssrn-only