W7202046516 Working papers AI × management and organizations

Algorithmic Collusion Under Asynchronous Price Updating

Ivan Conjeaud · Gaspard Abel · Argyris Kalogeratos

Also recorded as: doi:10.2139/ssrn.7221221 · ssrn:7221221

ssrn abstract page · 2026-08-10

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Recorded claims

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In a continuous-time Bertrand duopoly with two firms using Q-learning pricing algorithms, the abstract reports that asynchronous price updates generally impede algorithmic collusion, with effects depending on agent state and accessible rival-price information, and discusses pricing-regulation implications.

confidence: high ssrn-abstract-page apw-e1-ssrn-backfill

Scope: theoretical and numerical study of firm pricing and algorithmic collusion

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  • Abstract-level evidence only; full text and numerical experiments were not inspected.
  • The findings concern a modeled two-firm market and should not be generalized to observed pricing systems without additional evidence.

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