W7133993608 Working papers AI × management and organizations

Institutions, Organizations, and the Bounded Agency Imperative; Rethinking Governance Design in the Age of Agentic AI

Ravi Bhagavatula

Also recorded as: doi:10.2139/ssrn.6328579 · ssrn:6328579

ssrn abstract page · 2026-03-05

Recorded claims
1
coded from the inspected source
Evidence classes
1
ssrn-abstract-page
Recorded limitations
2
stated, never hidden

From the hash-bound evidence releases

Recorded claims

Each claim states what the inspected source says, at the recorded location—bounded by its scope and graded by its confidence. Nothing here is a synthesis across works.

The abstract introduces bounded agency as a governance constraint on delegated machine initiative and identifies reclaimability and algorithmic observability as institutional-design requirements.

confidence: high ssrn-abstract-page apw-e1-ssrn-backfill

Scope: abstract-level institutional and organizational theory

Structured relationships

In-corpus citations

Only source-supplied cites relationships whose two endpoints are admitted are shown. Invocation evidence remains a separate relationship.

Cites (0)

No in-corpus outgoing citation is available in the current enrichment coverage.

Cited by (0)

No in-corpus incoming citation is available in the current enrichment coverage.

Boundaries

Limitations & independence

Recorded at coding time, carried with the work forever. A claim without its limits is not evidence.

Recorded limitations

  • Abstract-level evidence only; full text not inspected.
  • The abstract states that its cross-domain discussion includes aviation, space, nuclear operations, trading, content moderation, and clinical AI; this record does not independently verify those comparisons.

Source independence

ssrn-only