W7134893563 Working papers AI × management and organizations

The Delegation Dilemma: Why Agentic AI Requires Organizational Redesign

Alok Khatri · Anisha Gyawali

Also recorded as: doi:10.2139/ssrn.6129906 · ssrn:6129906

ssrn abstract page · 2026-02-26

Recorded claims
1
coded from the inspected source
Evidence classes
1
ssrn-abstract-page
Recorded limitations
2
stated, never hidden

From the hash-bound evidence releases

Recorded claims

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The abstract argues that agentic-AI adoption stalls when decision rights, coordination mechanisms, and accountability structures are not redesigned as systems move from tools to organizational actors.

confidence: high ssrn-abstract-page apw-e1-ssrn-backfill

Scope: abstract-level organizational-design argument

Structured relationships

In-corpus citations

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Boundaries

Limitations & independence

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Recorded limitations

  • Abstract-level evidence only; full text not inspected.
  • The page labels the work a whitepaper; this record captures its stated argument rather than treating it as tested causal evidence.

Source independence

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