W7196999744 Working papers AI × management and organizations

The Fallback as Signal: Preserved Human Skill, Liability, and Competence Signaling in Credence-Good Markets under Improving AI

Andreas Bauer

Also recorded as: doi:10.2139/ssrn.7279038 · ssrn:7279038

ssrn abstract page · 2026-08-17

Recorded claims
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Evidence classes
1
ssrn-abstract-page
Recorded limitations
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Recorded claims

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The abstract models firms choosing how much to keep workers engaged as AI improves, with engagement building fallback skill; liability commitments signal that endogenous capability to mobile workers and clients and alter firms' training, specialization, and market participation incentives.

confidence: high ssrn-abstract-page apw-e1-ssrn-backfill

Scope: firm workforce engagement, deskilling, worker sorting, client inference, and credence-good markets

Structured relationships

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  • Abstract-level evidence only; analytical derivations and agent-based implementation were not inspected.
  • This work shares mechanisms and an author with companion papers, but the inspected SSRN page presents it as a distinct work and no version collapse is inferred.

Source independence

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